CVE-2026-77751
Description détaillée
A path traversal vulnerability existed in the handling of MISP object template names during STIX 2 import and MISP-to-STIX 2 export. MISP object names are passed to PyMISP's object-template resolution mechanism, which constructs a filesystem path by joining the configured MISP object-template directory, the object name, and definition.json. An object name originating from untrusted STIX or MISP content was not sufficiently restricted before being used in this filesystem path. An attacker able to supply a crafted object name containing path separators or traversal sequences such as ../ could therefore cause template resolution to escape the expected template directory and attempt to load a definition.json file from another location accessible to the process. During STIX 2 import, an attacker-controlled x_misp_name from a custom STIX object could directly reach this template-resolution mechanism. The issue could also become persistent. A malicious object name stored in a MISP event could later be processed again during STIX 2 export. Consequently, content originally introduced in one security context could trigger filesystem access later when the event is exported by a process operating with different or greater privileges. If a suitable definition.json file exists outside the intended template directory, its contents may be interpreted as a MISP object template and fields from that file copied into the converted object. This can result in unintended disclosure of locally accessible data represented by the template file and modification of the resulting object's metadata or semantics. The patches introduce strict validation of object-template names. Valid names are restricted to a single path component containing letters, digits, hyphens, or underscores. Names that do not meet these requirements are replaced with the generic unknown-template name before reaching PyMISP template resolution. The original rejected name is preserved in the object's comment and a warning is generated, preventing traversal while retaining the source information.
Dernières Vulnérabilités
CVE-2026-77769
The report.list procedure in packages/trpc/src/routers/report.ts accepted a projectId and a dashboardId and returned getReportsByDashboardId(dashboardId). The enforceAccess middleware in packages/trpc/src/trpc.ts verified membership for the supplied projectId, but nothing verified that the supplied dashboardId belonged to that project, and getReportsByDashboardId in packages/db/src/services/reports.service.ts selects reports by dashboardId alone with no project scoping. An authenticated user could therefore pair a projectId from their own organization, which satisfies the middleware, with a dashboardId belonging to another organization and receive every report in that dashboard. A correctly scoped helper, listReportsCore, already existed in the same service file and resolves the dashboard through getDashboardById(dashboardId, projectId) before returning reports, but the router did not use it.
CVE-2026-77768
The report.get procedure in packages/trpc/src/routers/report.ts accepted only a reportId and returned getReportById(reportId) directly. The enforceAccess middleware in packages/trpc/src/trpc.ts evaluates membership only when the input carries a projectId or organizationId key, so an input consisting of a reportId alone passed through unchecked, and getReportById in packages/db/src/services/reports.service.ts performs a findUnique on the report id with no project scoping. Any authenticated user could therefore read the full configuration of any saved report on the instance, including the owning projectId, event series, filters, breakdowns and formulas, by supplying its identifier. The adjacent update, delete and duplicate procedures resolve the report first and check getProjectAccess against the report's own projectId, so the omission was specific to this procedure.
CVE-2026-77767
Reconmap's API applies a fallback authorization policy in apps/api/app/Program.cs that requires an authenticated user holding the administrator role, so controllers without their own attribute reject anonymous callers. The report preview action in apps/api/app/Controllers/ReportsController.cs carries [AllowAnonymous] and therefore opts out of that policy. PreviewReport loads the Project row named by the id path segment, loads the linked Organisation through the project's ClientId, and renders both into default-report-template.html, which prints the project name and description together with the client organisation's name, address and URL. No authentication, project membership or role check is performed. Because the id is the auto-increment primary key of the project table, an unauthenticated remote caller can walk sequential ids to retrieve the engagement details and client organisation of every project on the instance, and the 404 returned for a missing id reveals which project ids exist. Reconmap stores penetration-testing engagements, so the disclosed descriptions and client records are sensitive by nature.
