CVE-2026-77768
Description détaillée
The report.get procedure in packages/trpc/src/routers/report.ts accepted only a reportId and returned getReportById(reportId) directly. The enforceAccess middleware in packages/trpc/src/trpc.ts evaluates membership only when the input carries a projectId or organizationId key, so an input consisting of a reportId alone passed through unchecked, and getReportById in packages/db/src/services/reports.service.ts performs a findUnique on the report id with no project scoping. Any authenticated user could therefore read the full configuration of any saved report on the instance, including the owning projectId, event series, filters, breakdowns and formulas, by supplying its identifier. The adjacent update, delete and duplicate procedures resolve the report first and check getProjectAccess against the report's own projectId, so the omission was specific to this procedure.
Vecteur d'attaque (CVSS)
Références et Patchs
Dernières Vulnérabilités
CVE-2026-77776
Headroom's LLM proxy derives the memory owner from the x-headroom-user-id request header. The header is read directly at several points in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, including the chat completion and websocket paths, and nothing binds the value to the caller. A client can therefore name another user's identifier and read or write that user's stored LLM memory. The fix introduces a single resolve_memory_identity seam in headroom/proxy/identity.py that honors the header only for loopback or allowlisted callers and otherwise binds the identity to the proxy-token fingerprint or the operating system user. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication.
CVE-2026-77775
Headroom's LLM proxy lets a client choose the upstream destination with the x-headroom-base-url request header. _resolve_openai_upstream_base in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py accepts the header value, requires only that it parse with an http or https scheme and a hostname, and returns it for use as the upstream base; _select_passthrough_base_url in headroom/providers/proxy_routes.py reads the same header for the passthrough routes. No check rejects loopback, link-local, or RFC 1918 destinations, and because the component is a proxy the upstream response is returned to the caller, so the request reaches internal services and cloud metadata addresses and their responses are disclosed. The Authorization header accompanying the request is forwarded unchanged to the caller-designated host. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication.
CVE-2026-77759
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in the transaction API in Roskus Prospero Flow CRM 5.0.0 through 5.3.5 allows an authenticated user to read the transactions of other companies on the same instance via an incremented identifier in GET /api/transaction/{id}, which is resolved without company scoping and without any permission check.