Suivez en temps réel les dernières failles de sécurité (CVE) identifiées mondialement. Données fournies par le National Vulnerability Database (NVD).
Ces informations proviennent directement du National Vulnerability Database (NVD).
DASEC GROUP vous accompagne dans la remédiation de ces failles.
Tract is a tiny, no-nonsense, self-contained TensorFlow and ONNX inference toolkit. Prior to 0.21.16, 0.22.2, and 0.23.1, tract-nnef uses unchecked usize multiplication in nnef/src/tensors.rs read_tensor for attacker-controlled tensor dimensions, the allocation size, and the reported tensor length. Loading a crafted NNEF archive through model_for_path or model_for_read reaches the default DatLoader and can make the wrapped size check accept a small allocation while data/src/tensor.rs as_slice_unchecked creates a much larger logical slice. Model construction through as_uniform can then read beyond the heap allocation and disclose adjacent data, and later access can terminate the process with a segmentation fault. The affected dense numeric tensor path does not include the independently guarded bool, String, or block-quant paths, and no out-of-bounds write or code execution was demonstrated. This issue is fixed in versions 0.21.16, 0.22.2, and 0.23.1.
SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.9, RTPChannel.OnRTPPacketReceived and the STUNAttribute.ParseMessageAttributes, STUNXORAddressAttribute, and STUNAddressAttribute parsing path index untrusted bytes without sufficient length checks, while UdpReceiver.EndReceiveFrom closes the channel when those operations raise a non-socket exception. A remote party can send a single short RTP packet or malformed zero-to-seven-byte STUN address attribute to the shared RTP/ICE socket, including during ICE connectivity checks before DTLS or STUN MESSAGE-INTEGRITY verification, and terminate the active RTP or WebRTC media session. The attacker must reach or learn the advertised ephemeral RTP/ICE port, but no authentication or user interaction is required, and the impact is limited to availability. This issue is fixed in version 10.0.9.
Anyquery is an SQL query engine built on top of SQLite. Prior to 0.4.5, anyquery server exposes file-backed SQLite virtual table modules such as csv_reader and log_reader through its MySQL-compatible server port without authentication, authorization, or directory restrictions. A remote attacker can use SQLite CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE statements to provide a local path to these modules, which use hashicorp/go-getter under the Anyquery server process and return the selected file contents as queryable table rows. The disclosure is limited only by the filesystem permissions of the server process and can expose system configuration, credentials, and private keys. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.5.
Anyquery is an SQL query engine built on top of SQLite. Prior to 0.4.5, anyquery server exposes URL-capable SQLite virtual table modules such as json_reader and log_reader through its unauthenticated MySQL-compatible server port without restricting outbound destinations. A remote attacker can provide a loopback, private-network, or link-local cloud metadata URL, causing go-getter in the Anyquery server process to fetch the selected resource and expose its response as queryable table data. This permits internal network probing, access to internal APIs, and disclosure of cloud credentials; low-integrity impact is possible when a reached internal API performs state-changing actions. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.5.
PocketSphinx is a small speech recognizer. Prior to 5.1.1, the trie language-model loaders in src/lm/ngram_model_trie.c do not adequately validate boundary conditions in ARPA, DMP, and binary format headers, and the acoustic-model loaders in src/mdef.c and src/util/bio.c use sscanf with unbounded string fields. Loading an invalid, corrupted, or malicious language or acoustic model can therefore cause stack or heap buffer overflows and memory corruption. An attacker who can write to a directory selected by POCKETSPHINX_PATH can replace or add a model file that PocketSphinx later loads; users of PocketSphinx 5prealpha have no backported patch and must migrate to the fixed release. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.1.
garminconnect is a Python 3 API wrapper for Garmin Connect that retrieves statistics and manages activities. Prior to 0.3.5, garminconnect/client.py Client.dump creates the OAuth token directory and garmin_tokens.json without explicit owner-only modes, so a permissive umask such as 022 can leave the directory mode at 0755 and the token file mode at 0644. garmin_tokens.json contains di_refresh_token, and another unprivileged user on a shared Linux or macOS host can read the token and obtain persistent access to the victim's Garmin Connect account, including health, fitness, activity, and device data. The Garmin.login tokenstore path is affected, and a pre-existing loosely permissioned token file remains exposed until rewritten or manually restricted. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.5.
UEFI Firmware Parser parses BIOS, Intel ME, and UEFI firmware structures including volumes, file systems, and files. Prior to 1.14, ReadCLen() in uefi_firmware/compression/Tiano/Decompress.c reads Number from GetBits(Sd, CBIT) with CBIT = 9 and can obtain 511 entries for the 510-element Sd->mCLen heap array because its loop does not enforce Index < NC. The CharC == 2 run-length path can additionally request up to 531 zero writes through Sd->mCLen[Index++] = 0. The normal CompressedSection.process() to efi_compressor.TianoDecompress() to TianoDecompress() to DecodeC() to ReadCLen() parsing path therefore permits crafted Tiano or EFI compressed firmware to corrupt heap memory, deterministically crash the parsing process, and potentially execute code depending on build and runtime details. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.
UEFI Firmware Parser parses BIOS, Intel ME, and UEFI firmware structures including volumes, file systems, and files. Prior to 1.14, MakeTable() in uefi_firmware/compression/Tiano/Decompress.c does not validate that bit-length values read from a crafted Tiano or EFI compressed firmware bitstream remain within the expected range from 0 through 16. The normal CompressedSection.process() to efi_compressor.TianoDecompress() to TianoDecompress() to ReadPTLen() to MakeTable() parsing path can consequently write beyond the stack-allocated Count[17] array and related decode tables. The resulting stack corruption deterministically crashes the parsing process and may permit code execution depending on build and runtime details. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.
Skipper is an HTTP router and reverse proxy for service composition. Prior to 0.26.22, Handler in dataclients/kubernetes/admission/admission.go passes the body of requests to the Kubernetes admission endpoint at :9443/admission directly to io.ReadAll(r.Body) without a size limit. An attacker with in-cluster network access and a valid Kubernetes client certificate can send a very large body that causes unbounded memory allocation and an out-of-memory termination of the Skipper process. The disruption is limited to Ingress and RouteGroup admission rather than pod creation or unrelated admission controllers, and Kubernetes normally restarts the process. This issue is fixed in version 0.26.22.
Skipper is an HTTP router and reverse proxy for service composition. Prior to 0.27.13, the routesrv component serves cluster-wide control-plane data without application-layer authentication through /routes, /routes/{zone}, /swarm/redis/shards, and /swarm/valkey/shards. The handlers registered in routesrv/routesrv.go, eskipBytes.ServeHTTP in routesrv/eskipbytes.go, RedisHandler.ServeHTTP in routesrv/redishandler.go, and ValkeyHandler.ServeHTTP in routesrv/valkeyhandler.go only restrict HTTP methods and do not authenticate callers. A compromised or otherwise attacker-controlled pod that can reach routesrv on the Kubernetes cluster network can bypass its namespace-scoped RBAC and read Ingress and RouteGroup backend URLs, filter-chain and OAuth or OIDC path details, and Redis or Valkey shard addresses across namespaces. NetworkPolicy can restrict reachability but does not remove the missing-authentication condition, and the established impact is confidentiality exposure rather than direct integrity or availability loss. This issue is fixed in version 0.27.13.
Envoy Gateway is an open source project for managing Envoy Proxy as a standalone or Kubernetes-based application gateway. Prior to 1.7.4 and 1.8.1, internal/wasm/imagefetcher.go follows tenant-controlled EnvoyExtensionPolicy spec.wasm[].code.image.url values to Docker or OCI Wasm layers, and extractWasmPluginBinary uses the untrusted tar-header h.Size value to allocate memory before validating the entry name or declared size. A small PAX or GNU tar header can therefore claim a multi-terabyte entry even though the surrounding LimitReader restricts only the bytes read from the stream, and no registry allowlist prevents a permitted tenant from selecting an attacker-controlled registry that the controller can reach. The allocation is attempted for every tar entry and can cause an unrecoverable Go runtime out-of-memory failure; because the custom resource persists, reconciliation repeatedly crash-loops the shared controller and causes a single-request, non-volumetric, cluster-wide control-plane denial of service. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.4 and 1.8.1.
Anyquery is an SQL query engine built on top of SQLite. Prior to 0.4.5, anyquery server forwards unauthenticated SQL from its MySQL-compatible server port to SQLite without restricting ATTACH DATABASE filesystem targets. A remote attacker can select any path writable by the Anyquery server process, cause SQLite to create a database file there, and place attacker-controlled table content in that file. This permits arbitrary file creation or overwrite, causing filesystem integrity loss and denial of service; remote code execution is possible only when another service interprets the written file or the process has a suitably privileged writable target. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.5.
Anyquery is an SQL query engine built on top of SQLite. Prior to 0.4.5, the clear_plugin_cache(plugin) SQL scalar function in namespace/other_functions.go passes the caller-controlled plugin parameter through path.Join to os.RemoveAll without rejecting traversal segments. A low-privileged bearer-token holder can invoke the function through the /v1/query HTTP endpoint, causing path.Join to resolve .. segments outside $XDG_CACHE_HOME/anyquery/plugins/ and os.RemoveAll to recursively delete any reachable directory writable by the Anyquery server process. This causes permanent data loss and denial of service without disclosing file contents. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.5.
A flaw was found in PackageKit. PackageKit skips the polkit authorization check for transactions carrying the SIMULATE (dry-run) flag. In the dnf5 backend, the RepoRemove handler ignores that contract and always executes the real transaction because its guard is written as (role == REPO_REMOVE || !SIMULATE), which is always true for RepoRemove. An unprivileged local user can therefore perform a genuine package uninstall while claiming to simulate. This vulnerability only affects systems using PackageKit with the dnf5 backend.
A flaw was found in NetworkManager-l2tp. The plugin writes attacker-controlled VPN connection properties (vpn.data and vpn.secrets values) unescaped into a generated ipsec.conf file that pluto loads as root. A local unprivileged user can create and activate their own L2TP VPN profile containing a newline-injected leftupdown directive; pluto executes that command as root when the IKE security association is established, resulting in local privilege escalation. This is the same bug class as CVE-2018-10900 (NetworkManager-vpnc).
