Suivez en temps réel les dernières failles de sécurité (CVE) identifiées mondialement. Données fournies par le National Vulnerability Database (NVD).
Ces informations proviennent directement du National Vulnerability Database (NVD).
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Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in Wise Chat <= 3.4 versions.
Subscriber Broken Authentication in MailMunch – Grow your Email List <= 3.2.5 versions.
Subscriber Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in WP Docs <= 2.3.1 versions.
Subscriber Arbitrary File Download in Youzify <= 1.3.7 versions.
Unauthenticated Broken Access Control in Robokassa payment gateway for Woocommerce <= 1.8.9 versions.
Unauthenticated Bypass Vulnerability in Simple Cloudflare Turnstile <= 1.42.1 versions.
Unauthenticated Content Injection in Simple Cloudflare Turnstile <= 1.42.1 versions.
Suricata is a network Intrusion Detection System, Intrusion Prevention System and Network Security Monitoring engine. Prior to versions 7.0.16 and 8.0.5, Suricata's HTTP/2 decompression path could grow the decompressed response-body buffer without an effective upper bound. A crafted HTTP/2 DATA payload using a high compression ratio, such as gzip, deflate, or brotli compressed data, could cause Suricata to allocate excessive memory while decompressing the payload. Versions 7.0.16 and 8.0.5 contain a fix. As a workaround, disable HTTP2.
Suricata is a network Intrusion Detection System, Intrusion Prevention System and Network Security Monitoring engine. Prior to version 7.0.16, the Lua TLS certificate information helper could dereference NULL certificate fields when a Lua script requested certificate information for TLS traffic where some certificate fields were absent. Crafted TLS traffic processed by a deployment using affected Lua TLS scripting could crash Suricata, resulting in denial of service. Version 7.0.16 contains a fix. As a workaround, avoid Lua scripts that call TLS certificate information helpers on untrusted traffic (`TlsGetCertInfo` function), or update scripts to handle missing certificate fields where possible.
The Sierra Wireless HL78xx modem GNSS driver (drivers/modem/hl78xx/, later drivers/modem/vendor_standalone/hl78xx/) embeds a generic struct gnss_nmea0183_match_data match_data inside struct hl78xx_gnss_data. The generic NMEA0183 match helper (drivers/gnss/gnss_nmea0183_match.c) requires that context to be the first member because its callbacks cast user_data directly to struct gnss_nmea0183_match_data . In the affected releases match_data was the second member (after const struct device dev), so it sat at a non-zero offset while gnss_nmea0183_match_init() initialized it at the correct address. The registered NMEA handlers instead pass the whole device data object (data->devices.gnss->data, offset 0), producing an offset-shifted type confusion between where state is initialized and where the parse callbacks read and write it. When NMEA sentences from the GNSS receiver are parsed, the GGA/RMC callbacks write parsed fix data into the wrong location within the struct, and the GSV callback (gnss_nmea0183_match_gsv_callback, active under CONFIG_GNSS_SATELLITES) reads its satellites pointer and bound from the wrong offsets — non-pointer bytes of struct hl78xx_gnss_data — and then writes parsed struct gnss_satellite entries through that bogus pointer. This is a write through an uninitialized/wild pointer with a garbage bound. The NMEA handlers are registered by default (CONFIG_HL78XX_GNSS_SOURCE_NMEA is the default GNSS source) on devices using the HL78xx GNSS. The driver runs in kernel context and the NMEA data originates from the GNSS radio front-end, so a party able to influence the GNSS signal (for example GNSS/GPS spoofing at radio proximity) can drive the kernel-side parser into the faulty write. The most likely impact is a crash (denial of service) because the bogus pointer resolves to a fixed near-NULL value, with adjacent-memory corruption possible on MMU-less targets. Confidentiality is not affected. Exploitation requires the satellites feature to be enabled and active, so attack complexity is high.
MISP contains an HTML injection vulnerability in the MISPElementHTMLFormatterTool component, which is responsible for rendering MISP element references (attributes, objects, and tags) into inline HTML during PDF report export via the convert_markdown_to_pdf module. The attribute(), objectAttribute(), object(), and tag() methods interpolated user-controlled fields (attribute type, attribute value, object name, object relation, tag name, tag colour, and tag text colour) directly into HTML templates without applying HTML entity encoding. An authenticated user with the ability to create or modify MISP attributes, objects, or tags could embed arbitrary HTML markup in these fields. When a report containing such elements was exported to PDF, the unescaped content was rendered as live HTML rather than inert text, potentially injecting script tags, breaking the document structure, or altering the visual content of the exported report. Additionally, the attribute() method contained a template with hardcoded sample values ("domain-ip" and "google.com") instead of format placeholders, meaning every plain attribute reference in a PDF displayed the sample text rather than the actual indicator value, constituting a data-integrity defect in the exported document. The vulnerability requires an authenticated actor with write access to MISP elements and a subsequent PDF export of a report referencing those elements. The security impact is primarily to the integrity of the exported document and, depending on the HTML-to-PDF rendering engine, potential execution of injected markup during the conversion step. Version affected: ≤2.5.45
Affected versions of MISP do not consistently enforce the acting user's authorization when instantiating event templates. For templates using distribution = 4, the template can specify a sharing_group_id. The instantiation path passed that value into event creation without verifying that the user instantiating the template was actually permitted to use the selected sharing group. The commit notes that Event::_add() only performed its own sharing-group authorization in another code path, leaving template instantiation able to write the identifier directly. The same instantiation path also attached template-specified tags without checking the user's normal tagging permissions. In addition, it hardcoded local => 0, meaning tags marked local_only could be attached globally and consequently propagate through synchronization or export, contrary to their intended restriction. The fix adds explicit SharingGroup::canUse() authorization for the acting user, applies the same tag-modification checks used by normal event tagging, and ensures local_only tags are attached locally. Version affected: ≤2.5.45
EspoCRM before 10.0.4 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery. HostCheck::ipAddressIsNotInternal(), which validates outbound URLs to block requests to internal/private IP addresses, strips ::ffff: (IPv4-mapped IPv6) prefixes but does not recognize IPv6 transition addresses that embed private IPv4 addresses: NAT64 (64:ff9b::), 6to4 (2002::), and Teredo (2001:0000::). An attacker who controls a domain with AAAA records pointing to such transition addresses can bypass both the internal-host validation and the CURLOPT_RESOLVE IP-pinning check, causing EspoCRM to issue outbound requests to internal network services. Affected paths include POST /Attachment/fromImageUrl, reachable by any authenticated user with attachment access, and outbound webhook delivery, which requires an admin or API user.
CyberPanel before 3.0.5 fails to enforce two-factor authentication on API endpoints, allowing attackers to bypass TOTP requirements using password-derived tokens. Attackers who obtain an administrator's password can derive API tokens and perform administrative operations or create authenticated sessions without the second factor.
Snipe-IT's predefined kit checkout path does not enforce Full Multiple Company Support (FMCS) tenant isolation on the checkout target. Unlike the single, bulk, API, accessory, license and consumable checkout paths, App\Services\PredefinedKitCheckoutService never calls $item->canCheckoutTo($target); it only performs the actor-vs-item policy check and an availability check before persisting the checkout. With FMCS enabled, a non-superuser who belongs to at least two companies and holds the assets.checkout permission can POST to /kits/{kit}/checkout with a user_id belonging only to company B and have a company-A asset (and likewise kit licenses, consumables and accessories) assigned to that user, bypassing the company-mismatch check that blocks the same operation on every other checkout path. The issue is fixed in Snipe-IT 8.7.2; it was runtime-verified on v8.6.3 and code-inspected on v8.7.1, and the affected service has lacked the check since 2019, so earlier FMCS deployments are likely also affected.
