CVE-2026-93484
Description détaillée
Znuny through 7.3.6 constructs a ticket-search database query by directly concatenating user-supplied input into the SQL statement. This lack of proper sanitization or the use of parameterized queries allows an attacker to inject arbitrary SQL commands, leading to data theft, modification, or denial of service. Specifically this is in Kernel::System::Ticket::TicketSearch and Kernel::System::Ticket::ArticleSearchIndex::DB via the ContentSearch parameter. The parameter is expected to be either "AND" or "OR", but its value was concatenated directly into the generated SQL query without validation.
Références et Patchs
Dernières Vulnérabilités
CVE-2026-93483
In Znuny through 7.3.6, an attacker can bypass specific standard login procedures and gain unauthorized access to sensitive system functions by manipulating a specific HTTP request header. Because the application incorrectly trusts this header, an attacker can impersonate any user, including administrators, without requiring a password. This grants full access to confidential data and system controls. More specifically, the HTTPBasicAuth modules for the agent (Kernel::System::Auth::HTTPBasicAuth) and customer (Kernel::System::CustomerAuth::HTTPBasicAuth) interfaces read the username to log in not only from $ENV{REMOTE_USER} (set by the web server after successful authentication), but also, as a fallback, from $ENV{HTTP_REMOTE_USER}, which is populated directly from an attacker-controllable "Remote-User" request header. On systems where HTTPBasicAuth was configured as the authentication backend, this allowed an attacker to log in as any existing user by sending a request with a forged Remote-User header, without providing any credentials.
CVE-2026-76664
A security vulnerability in HPE NonStop EXPAND may result in out-of-bounds memory read/write operations
CVE-2026-110912
In DragonFly BSD through 6.4.2 before 4bb22ff, the ARP input handlers arpintr() and in_arpinput() (sys/netinet/if_ether.c) do not validate the hardware address length (ar_hln) and protocol address length (ar_pln) fields of incoming ARP packets. in_arpreply() then uses these attacker-controlled values as memcpy lengths when copying from kernel buffers that are only 6 and 4 bytes long, resulting in an out-of-bounds read of kernel heap and stack memory that is copied into the ARP reply sent back to the requester. An unauthenticated attacker on the adjacent network can use a single crafted ARP request to disclose up to roughly 250 bytes of each type of kernel memory, including kernel pointers. This is expected to be fixed in the 6.6 stable release when that is available.