CVE-2026-92582
Description détaillée
AVideo (WWBN/AVideo) through 29.0 (commit e01e41ecc) is vulnerable to cross-site request forgery. objects/videoAddNew.json.php disables AVideo's automatic CSRF guard ($global['skipAutoCSRFCheck']) and the untrusted-request check ($global['bypassSameDomainCheck']) merely because 'user' and 'pass' parameters are present in the request; the values are never validated and are read from $_REQUEST, so an attacker can supply them in the query string of a cross-site request. Because User::loginFromRequestIfNotLogged() returns immediately when a session already exists, a victim who is authenticated by cookie satisfies the check while the attacker-supplied credentials are discarded. An attacker who lures an authenticated user with upload rights to visit a crafted page can therefore submit cross-origin requests that modify video records — including ownership transfer (setUsers_id), deletion of user-group access restrictions, can_download, can_share, only_for_paid, video_password, rating, status, creation date, and view count. For a victim with administrator or Permissions::canAdminVideos() rights, any video on the site can be altered, including removing group restrictions from private content. No patched version was available at the time of the advisory.
Vecteur d'attaque (CVSS)
Dernières Vulnérabilités
CVE-2026-85789
Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.
CVE-2026-65388
A remote attacker who controls a container registry may be able to direct a client's token request to a host of the attacker's choice, and disclose the victim's registry credentials to that host. This vulnerability is addressed in containerization version 0.41.0.
CVE-2026-61599
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, the djust live transport resolves the LiveView to mount from a client-supplied dotted path by calling `__import__(module_path, ...)`. The module is imported — running its top-level code (import side effects) — before the framework checks that the resolved object is a `LiveView` subclass and before any per-view authentication. The `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` allowlist that should contain this is fail-open (`if allowed_modules:` — skipped when the setting is unset, the framework default) and uses loose `startswith` matching. An unauthenticated WebSocket client (the WS handshake does not require auth; per-view auth runs only after import + instantiate) can therefore send a `mount` / `live_redirect_mount` / `url_change` frame (or an SSE mount) with `view = "<any.importable.module>.AnyName"` and cause the server to import — and execute the top-level code of — any importable Python module by name. Version 1.0.7 fixes the issue with a fail-closed resolution gate (`djust._view_resolution.is_view_import_allowed`): a client view path resolves only if (a) its module is already loaded (`sys.modules` — so resolving runs no new code; URL-routed views loaded by URLconf at startup keep working with zero config) or (b) it matches `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` on a module-segment boundary (explicit opt-in for lazily-imported views). The gate runs before `__import__` at all three sinks (+ defense-in-depth inside `_instantiate_view`). As a workaround, set `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` to the narrow list of modules that contain your mountable LiveView classes. (Note: pre-patch the allowlist is `startswith`-matched and the import still precedes the subclass check, so this is mitigation, not a complete fix.)