CVE-2026-85652
Description détaillée
The Photo Gallery by 10Web – Mobile-Friendly Image Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to time-based SQL Injection via 'album_id' Shortcode Attribute in all versions up to, and including, 1.8.44 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with author-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database. An Author-level user can store a SQL injection payload inside a published post's shortcode attribute, causing the payload to execute when any visitor renders the post; notably, the unsanitized value appears on both sides of a UNION query, potentially doubling the observable time-based delay.
Vecteur d'attaque (CVSS)
Références et Patchs
Dernières Vulnérabilités
CVE-2026-93578
Missing Extended Key Usage (EKU) check in OCSP Client allows certificate revocation bypass
CVE-2026-93575
### Summary Netty's fix for CVE-2026-44248 is incomplete. The decoder checks if the MQTT packet's `Remaining Length` exceeds `maxBytesInMessage`, but fails to validate the `Properties Length` against the `Remaining Length`. An attacker can bypass the size limit by sending a small `Remaining Length` but an enormous `Properties Length`. This forces Netty to buffer and parse millions of properties, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to trigger excessive memory and CPU consumption, leading to OutOfMemoryError. ### Details In `io.netty.handler.codec.mqtt.MqttDecoder`, the `decodeProperties()` helper method reads `totalPropertiesLength` and attempts to parse that many bytes. If the buffer lacks the full length, a `Signal` is thrown. The `catch` block inside `decode()` only enforces `maxBytesInMessage` against `bytesRemainingBeforeVariableHeader` (the packet's `Remaining Length`). By sending a `CONNECT` packet with a small `Remaining Length` but a huge `Properties Length`, the size check passes. `ReplayingDecoder` then buffers data from the network until the huge `Properties Length` is reached, parsing millions of `UserProperty` objects and exhausting CPU and memory. #
CVE-2026-93572
## Summary `RedisArrayAggregator` recently added `maxElements` and `maxNestedArrayDepth` limits to fix public Redis resource-exhaustion advisories. The limits are independent, but the allocator remains eager: every positive nested RESP array header creates `new ArrayList<RedisMessage>(length)` before any child element exists. With the default constructor, an attacker can send nested array headers with length `1,000,000` until the default nesting limit of `1024` is reached. This can reserve up to `1,024,000,000` child slots from roughly 12 KB of RESP input. This is backing capacity, not logical list size: `ArrayList(int)` constructs an empty list with the specified initial capacity. ## Technical Details Current `decodeRedisArrayHeader(...)` checks the two limits independently: ```java if (header.length() > maxElements) { throw new CodecException("this codec doesn't support longer length than " + maxElements); } if (depths.size() >= maxNestedArrayDepth) { releaseAndClearDepths(); throw new CodecException("max nested array depth exceeded: " + maxNestedArrayDepth); } depths.push(new AggregateState((int) header.length())); ``` `AggregateState` i