CVE-2026-77067
Description détaillée
The setWebhookResolver in packages/api/src/resolvers/webhooks/index.ts stores the caller-supplied url without any address validation, and the file imports no validation helper. When a subscribed event fires, callWebhook in packages/api/src/jobs/call_webhook.ts issues axios.request with that url, the method and Content-Type recorded on the webhook, and a JSON body carrying the event data, so an authenticated user can make the server send repeated attacker-shaped requests to internal endpoints, including link-local metadata addresses. The request is blind: callWebhook discards the result and writes only a success line or the axios error to the server log, so the response is not returned through the API.
Vecteur d'attaque (CVSS)
Références et Patchs
Dernières Vulnérabilités
CVE-2026-77085
n8n before 2.34.1 and 2.33.x before 2.33.4 contains an SSRF protection bypass in the SearXNG Agent tool. The tool sent requests to the user-supplied API URL using a raw HTTP client that did not route through n8n's centralized SSRF protection. On instances with N8N_SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED=true, an authenticated user with permission to create SearXNG credentials and configure a personal agent could set the API URL to an internal host, causing the n8n server to connect to that host and return the response content through the Agent chat output.
CVE-2026-77084
n8n before 1.123.69 (and 2.x before 2.33.4 / 2.34.1) contains a code execution vulnerability in the Git node. The Git node executed certain repository-local git configuration values without neutralizing them, so any subsequent Git node operation against a repository containing a malicious value would execute it as the n8n process user. This is not reachable through the Git node's own configuration controls and requires a separate file-write vulnerability elsewhere to plant the malicious value.
CVE-2026-77083
n8n is a workflow automation platform. In versions prior to 1.123.69, 2.33.4, and 2.34.1, the JavaScript Code node's VM sandbox did not freeze the sandbox's Function.prototype, allowing an authenticated user with the ability to create and execute workflows to pollute it from within a Code node execution and recover a reference to the host's globalThis, resulting in a sandbox escape. The full exploit chain additionally depends on specific modules being available as allowlisted imports in the deployment's configuration. The issue is fixed in versions 1.123.69, 2.33.4, and 2.34.1.