Retour à la veille

CVE-2026-75583

Publié : 19 août 2026
Modifié : 19 août 2026
Lien officiel NVD
Score CVSS
3.5
LOW

Description détaillée

keeper.sh's calendar module version prior to 2.18.14 contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) guard bypass vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to reach private network addresses by exploiting a DNS rebinding attack against the two-phase URL validation and connection flow. The SSRF guard validates a hostname's resolved IP addresses but discards them before the actual HTTP connection is opened, allowing an attacker who controls authoritative DNS to return a public address during validation and a private address during the subsequent independent socket-level DNS resolution, causing the guard to pass while the outbound connection reaches internal infrastructure such as cloud instance metadata endpoints.

Vecteur d'attaque (CVSS)

Vecteur brut :CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

Références et Patchs

Dernières Vulnérabilités

CVE-2026-75149

marimo before 0.23.15 contains a code injection vulnerability in the notebook configuration handler that allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands by supplying a crafted MCP server entry with an attacker-controlled command value embedded in a notebook. When the notebook is opened in edit mode, marimo launches the specified command as a local subprocess before any notebook cell is executed, requiring no authentication or cell execution to trigger the vulnerability.

VOIR DÉTAILS

CVE-2026-73829

Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to redeem one confirmed on-chain payment for multiple paid-resource accesses. The type="hash" credential path in MPP.Methods.Tempo.verify/2 guards against replay with a non-atomic check-then-mark sequence: check_hash_unused/2 reads the dedup store, an eth_getTransactionReceipt round trip verifies the payment on chain, and only then does mark_hash_used/2 write the mark. Concurrent requests carrying the same settled payment hash all pass the read before any of them writes, so each is issued a receipt. The store's atomic check_and_mark/2 primitive is available and used by the type="transaction" path, but the hash path calls plain get and put even when the configured store implements it. Exploitation requires a dedup store to be configured; the default nil store is stateless and documented as offering no replay protection at all. This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.1.

VOIR DÉTAILS

CVE-2026-73541

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty. MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy enforces its ceilings (max_gas, max_fee_per_gas, max_priority_fee_per_gas, the worst-case gas_limit * max_fee_per_gas <= max_total_fee budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. reserve_hash_atomic/2 is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times max_total_fee, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period. This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0.

VOIR DÉTAILS