CVE-2026-72594
Description détaillée
A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in lobehub/lobe-chat through v2.2.13 allows a low-privileged authenticated user to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application by uploading a crafted SVG file as a user avatar. The avatar upload handler derives the stored file extension and S3 content type from the original filename rather than inspecting file content, enabling an attacker to store an SVG containing a script element that executes in the browser of any user who views the attacker's profile or avatar.
Vecteur d'attaque (CVSS)
Références et Patchs
Dernières Vulnérabilités
CVE-2026-68092
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: time/jiffies: Register jiffies clocksource before usage Teddy reported that a XEN HVM has a long boot delay, which was bisected to the recent enhancements to the negative motion detection. It turned out that the jiffies clocksource is used in early boot before it is registered, which leaves the max_delta_raw field at zero. That causes the read out to be clamped to the max delta of 0, which means time is not making progress. Cure it by ensuring that it is initialized before its first usage in timekeeping_init().
CVE-2026-68091
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: stop hardware after post-start probe failures wacom_parse_and_register() starts HID hardware before registering inputs and initializing pad LEDs/remotes. Those later steps can fail, but their error paths currently release Wacom resources without stopping the HID hardware. Route post-hid_hw_start() failures through hid_hw_stop() before releasing driver resources. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code.
CVE-2026-68090
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: debugobjects: Plug race against a concurrent OOM disable syzbot reported a puzzling splat: WARNING: kernel/time/hrtimer.c:443 at stub_timer+0xa/0x20 stub_timer() is installed as timer callback function in hrtimer_fixup_assert_init(), which is invoked when debug_object_assert_init() can't find a shadow object. In that case debug objects emits a warning about it before invoking the fixup. Though the provided console log lacks this warning and instead has the following a few seconds before the splat: ODEBUG: Out of memory. ODEBUG disabled So the object was looked up in debug_object_assert_init() and the lookup failed due a concurrent out of memory situation which disabled debug objects and freed the shadow objects: debug_object_assert_init() if (!debug_objects_enabled) return; obj = alloc(); if (!obj) { // Out of memory debug_objects_enabled = false; free_objects(); obj = lookup_or_alloc(); // The lookup failed because the other side // removed the objects, so this returns // an error code as the object in question // is not statically initialized if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(obj)) return; if (!obj) { debug_oom(); return; } print(...) if (!debug_objects_enabled) return; fixup(...) The debug object splat is skipped because debug_objects_enabled is false, but the fixup callback is invoked unconditionally, which makes the timer disfunctional. This is only a problem in debug_object_assert_init() and debug_object_activate() as both have to handle statically initialized objects and therefore must handle the error pointer return case gracefully. All other places only handle the found/not found case and the NULL pointer return is a signal for OOM. Otherwise they get a valid shadow object. Plug the hole by checking whether debug objects are still enabled before invoking the print and fixup function in those two places.