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CVE-2026-71210

Publié : 5 août 2026
Modifié : 5 août 2026
Lien officiel NVD
Score CVSS
5.3
MEDIUM

Description détaillée

Mealie's AsyncSafeTransport SSRF guard (mealie/pkgs/safehttp/transport.py) resolves a target hostname once, checks the resolved IP against private-range rules, but then issues the actual outbound HTTP request using the original hostname, which the underlying async transport re-resolves independently. Because the validated IP is never pinned to the actual connection, a DNS-rebinding attacker (returning a public IP to the validation lookup and a private/metadata IP to the real connection) defeats the guard. This is reachable by any authenticated user via /api/recipes/create/url, /api/recipes/test-scrape-url, and /api/recipes/{slug}/image, and the scraper reflects fetched content back to the requester, allowing an authenticated user to read internal HTTP services and cloud-metadata endpoints.

Vecteur d'attaque (CVSS)

Vecteur brut :CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Références et Patchs

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