CVE-2026-69251
Description détaillée
Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, Flowise record manager and agent memory nodes allowed users to set arbitrary TypeORM DataSource options through the additionalConfig input in packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/MySQLRecordManager/MySQLrecordManager.ts, packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/PostgresRecordManager/PostgresRecordManager.ts, packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/SQLiteRecordManager/SQLiteRecordManager.ts, packages/components/nodes/memory/AgentMemory/MySQLAgentMemory/MySQLAgentMemory.ts, and packages/components/nodes/memory/AgentMemory/AgentMemory.ts. TypeORM DataSource options such as entities, subscribers, and migrations can load local JavaScript files, allowing an authenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server by uploading a JavaScript payload and referencing it from additionalConfig.entities. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3.
Dernières Vulnérabilités
CVE-2026-69254
Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, executeJavaScriptCode() accepted caller-provided nodeVMOptions and merged them over the default NodeVM security settings in packages/components/src/utils.ts. An authenticated attacker reaching packages/server/src/routes/node-custom-functions/index.ts could run a custom function that imported flowise-components/dist/src/utils.js, called executeJavaScriptCode() again with nodeVMOptions.require.builtin set to allow all built-in modules, and then required child_process to execute arbitrary system commands as root on the Flowise server. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3.
CVE-2026-69253
Flowise is a drag-and-drop user interface for building customized large language model (LLM) flows. Prior to version 3.1.3, several custom-tool components — AgentAsTool, ChatflowTool, and ExecuteFlow — ran code in the in-process vm2 sandbox. To build that code, they inserted a user-controlled baseURL value straight into the JavaScript source, for example const url = "${baseURL}/..."; . The only check on baseURL was isValidURL , but a valid-looking URL can still contain characters that break out of a code string. An authenticated user could craft a baseURL that passed this check, closed the surrounding string, and injected their own JavaScript into the sandboxed script (code injection, CWE-94). The vm2 sandbox runs in the same Node.js process as Flowise and exposes risky dependencies. As a result, the injected code could escape the sandbox and run arbitrary code on the Flowise server as the Flowise process user. Exploitation only requires an authenticated session. The issue is fixed in version 3.1.3, which passes the URL to the sandbox as data instead of inserting it into code and adds stricter URL validation.
CVE-2026-69252
Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, the /api/v1/files route was protected only by the feat:files feature gate and did not enforce checkPermission on GET or DELETE. A low-privileged authenticated API key with unrelated permissions could call GET /api/v1/files to list files under the organization storage root and DELETE /api/v1/files?path=... to delete files belonging to other workspaces in the same organization because getAllFiles and deleteFile used activeOrganizationId and a user-controlled path without restricting access by permissions or activeWorkspaceId. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3.