CVE-2026-66920
Description détaillée
Pivotick contains an uncontrolled-recursion vulnerability when processing caller-supplied graph and node data. The affected graph algorithms recursively traversed graph edges, while the JSON viewer recursively processed each level of a node’s data structure. A specially crafted graph containing an excessively long path, deeply nested properties, or circular object references could therefore exhaust the JavaScript call stack when Pivotick calculates a layout or displays a node in the inspection modal. Successful exploitation may cause an uncaught exception, freeze the affected page, or crash the browser tab, resulting in a client-side denial of service. No confidentiality or integrity impact has been identified. The patch replaces the recursive graph traversals with iterative stack-based implementations and limits the reachability calculation to 1,000,000 edge traversals. It also limits JSON rendering to 64 levels and detects circular references before descending further into an object.
Dernières Vulnérabilités
CVE-2026-67173
Pivotick did not validate the URL scheme of node imagePath values derived from graph data before assigning them to SVG image resources. An attacker able to supply crafted graph data could set an image path to a malicious URI. When a victim rendered the affected graph, the browser could resolve the attacker-controlled URI and initiate an unintended request or invoke scheme-specific handling in the victim’s context. Depending on the URI, browser behaviour, and installed protocol handlers, exploitation could disclose limited client or network metadata, facilitate rendering-based tracking, or attempt to access local or internal resources. Exploitation requires a victim to load or render graph data containing the malicious imagePath. The patch normalizes ASCII whitespace and control characters in URI schemes and restricts image paths to relative URLs or the http, https, data, and blob schemes.
CVE-2026-66922
Pivotick used plain JavaScript objects as lookup tables indexed by caller-controlled graph node identifiers in its tree-layout and cycle-detection components. Node identifiers matching properties inherited from Object.prototype, such as constructor, toString, or __proto__, were not handled as ordinary identifiers. These values could be interpreted as existing inherited properties, resolve to values of an unexpected type, or—in the case of __proto__ assignments—modify the prototype of an internal lookup object. An attacker who can supply graph data containing crafted node identifiers could consequently cause nodes or edges to be silently omitted, produce incorrect hierarchy levels, bypass or corrupt cycle-detection results, or trigger an exception that interrupts graph processing and rendering. This affects the integrity of graph visualisations and analytics and may cause a client-side denial-of-service condition. The affected code also failed to safely handle edges whose source node was absent from the supplied node set. Furthermore, calculating the maximum tree depth by spreading all level values into Math.max() could exceed the JavaScript function-argument limit when processing a sufficiently large graph, resulting in an exception and denial of service. The patch replaces identifier-keyed plain objects with Map instances, ignores invalid edges during tree construction, and calculates the maximum depth iteratively.
CVE-2026-66921
Pivotick’s Markdown node-reference renderer failed to HTML-escape the attacker-controlled nodeName value before interpolating it into both the data-node-name attribute and the body of a generated <span> element. Because the node-reference tokenizer rejected only square brackets, a crafted node name could still contain quotation marks, angle brackets, or other HTML metacharacters. An attacker could therefore terminate the quoted attribute or inject additional HTML elements and event-handler attributes. When malicious node-reference content is rendered by a consumer that does not apply DOMPurify or equivalent sanitization, arbitrary JavaScript may execute in the victim’s browser in the security context of the application. Successful exploitation requires a victim to open or render a crafted graph or note and could allow the attacker to access same-origin information, modify displayed content, or perform actions using the victim’s session. The patch resolves the issue by applying context-appropriate HTML escaping to node names before inserting them into either HTML text or quoted attribute values. The shared escaping function now encodes ampersands, angle brackets, and both types of quotation marks.