CVE-2026-61594
Description détaillée
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, the live (WebSocket) transport authorizes a mount via `check_view_auth`, not Django's `View.dispatch()` chain. As a result, standard Django authorization — `LoginRequiredMixin`, `PermissionRequiredMixin`, `UserPassesTestMixin`, `@method_decorator(login_required, name="dispatch")`, and custom `dispatch()` guards — and the djust admin extension's staff gate (applied only in the HTTP `as_view` wrapper) were enforced on the initial HTTP GET but silently bypassed over WebSocket, where all events and state flow. An anonymous or under-privileged client could open a WebSocket and mount such a view — including admin list/create/change/delete — and dispatch its handlers. This is fixed in djust 1.0.7. `check_view_auth` now honors the Django `AccessMixin` family on every transport; a new system check S004 fails loud at startup on auth patterns the runtime cannot safely replay (decorator/overridden-`dispatch` forms); and the admin base mixin declares `login_required = True` + an active-staff `check_permissions` gate. As a workaround, gate views using djust's `login_required` / `permission_required` / `check_permissions` attributes (honored on all transports) rather than HTTP-only mixins/decorators.
Vecteur d'attaque (CVSS)
Dernières Vulnérabilités
CVE-2026-85789
Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.
CVE-2026-65388
A remote attacker who controls a container registry may be able to direct a client's token request to a host of the attacker's choice, and disclose the victim's registry credentials to that host. This vulnerability is addressed in containerization version 0.41.0.
CVE-2026-61599
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, the djust live transport resolves the LiveView to mount from a client-supplied dotted path by calling `__import__(module_path, ...)`. The module is imported — running its top-level code (import side effects) — before the framework checks that the resolved object is a `LiveView` subclass and before any per-view authentication. The `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` allowlist that should contain this is fail-open (`if allowed_modules:` — skipped when the setting is unset, the framework default) and uses loose `startswith` matching. An unauthenticated WebSocket client (the WS handshake does not require auth; per-view auth runs only after import + instantiate) can therefore send a `mount` / `live_redirect_mount` / `url_change` frame (or an SSE mount) with `view = "<any.importable.module>.AnyName"` and cause the server to import — and execute the top-level code of — any importable Python module by name. Version 1.0.7 fixes the issue with a fail-closed resolution gate (`djust._view_resolution.is_view_import_allowed`): a client view path resolves only if (a) its module is already loaded (`sys.modules` — so resolving runs no new code; URL-routed views loaded by URLconf at startup keep working with zero config) or (b) it matches `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` on a module-segment boundary (explicit opt-in for lazily-imported views). The gate runs before `__import__` at all three sinks (+ defense-in-depth inside `_instantiate_view`). As a workaround, set `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` to the narrow list of modules that contain your mountable LiveView classes. (Note: pre-patch the allowlist is `startswith`-matched and the import still precedes the subclass check, so this is mitigation, not a complete fix.)