CVE-2026-58488
Description détaillée
HedgeDoc is an open source, real-time, collaborative, markdown notes application. Versions prior to 1.11.0 allowed attackers to circumvent the rate-limiting of the /login and /register routes by spoofing IP addresses. HedgeDoc instances checked for CloudFlare's cf-connecting-ip header and used that instead of the users real IP address, if the header was present even when the request did not originate from Cloudflare. This made it possible for an attacker to spam login requests or create multiple arbitrary accounts by sending another cf-connecting-ip header every few requests. The issue has been fixed in version 1.11.0.
Références et Patchs
Dernières Vulnérabilités
CVE-2026-15619
A weakness has been identified in mosaxiv clawlet up to 0.2.10. The impacted element is the function web_fetch of the file tools/tool_web_fetch.go of the component IPv4 Handler. This manipulation of the argument url causes server-side request forgery. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The reported GitHub issue was closed with the label "not planned".
CVE-2026-15618
A security flaw has been discovered in mosaxiv clawlet up to 0.2.10. The affected element is the function guardExecCommand of the file tools/tool_exec.go of the component exec Safety Guard. The manipulation results in protection mechanism failure. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The reported GitHub issue was closed with the label "not planned".
CVE-2026-58489
HedgeDoc is an open source, real-time collaborative markdown notes application. Prior to 1.11.0, the GitHub Gist export flow created an OAuth2 state value but only checked that it was present rather than validating it against the value expected for the user's session. Because the state was not properly validated, an attacker could forge a callback URL containing their own valid GitHub OAuth code. When processing the callback, HedgeDoc used the victim's logged-in session to select which note to export, but the attacker's authorization code to determine which GitHub account received it. As a result, a logged-in victim who clicked a crafted link could export their own private, protected, or limited note directly into a Gist controlled by the attacker. This issue has been fixed in version 1.11.0.