CVE-2026-47127
Description détaillée
Ghostfolio is an open source wealth management software. Prior to version 3.4.0, Ghostfolio's Stripe checkout success-URL handler at `GET /api/v1/subscription/stripe/callback?checkoutSessionId=<id>` retrieves the Stripe Checkout Session by ID and unconditionally grants a Premium subscription to the session's `client_reference_id` — without ever checking `session.payment_status` or `session.status`. There is no separate Stripe webhook endpoint with `stripe-signature` verification; this callback is the sole code path that creates Stripe-driven subscriptions. Any authenticated user can self-grant a 1-year Premium subscription without ever paying. Version 3.4.0 rejects sessions unless `session.payment_status === 'paid'` AND `session.status === 'complete'` (fails closed). Additionally, new unique `stripeCheckoutSessionId` column → a session can't be redeemed twice (race-safe via DB unique constraint).
Vecteur d'attaque (CVSS)
Dernières Vulnérabilités
CVE-2026-52880
Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Versions from 1.7.14 through 1.7.17 are vulnerable to a remotely triggerable denial of service. Both REST APIs are started with the Gin Engine.Run convenience method, which serves requests through Go's default HTTP server with no ReadHeaderTimeout, ReadTimeout, or MaxHeaderBytes configured. As a result, incoming connections that never complete their request headers are held open indefinitely. When a REST listener is reachable beyond localhost through the documented all-interface bind or a Docker port-publish deployment, a single unauthenticated client can open many slow-header connections and hold them open until server file descriptors are exhausted, preventing the API from accepting new connections. This renders the REST API unavailable to legitimate clients. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.18.
CVE-2026-52879
Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. In versions 1.7.14 through 1.7.17, the direct-message ingress handler spawns a new goroutine for every incoming direct message before the processor-level antiflood layer makes any admission decision, with no semaphore, throttler, or bound on the number of concurrent in-flight spawns. Because the antiflood check runs inside the spawned goroutine rather than before it, a single connected peer can open a direct-send stream and send a stream of well-formed messages to force unbounded goroutine creation, where each goroutine allocates its own stack and holds a message reference until processing completes, adding scheduler and garbage-collection pressure faster than the runtime can drain it. This lets one peer degrade the node's availability and its ability to process legitimate traffic, resulting in a remotely triggerable denial of service. The issue is fixed in 1.7.18.
CVE-2026-52878
Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Versions 1.7.14 through 1.7.17 are vulnerable to a nil-pointer panic triggered by a protobuf Transaction whose embedded RawData sub-message is omitted. This omission causes RawData to decode to nil. Every transaction gossiped on the Klever-Go P2P network is decoded and validated synchronously inside the libp2p pubsub topic-validator callback, where txVersionChecker.CheckTxVersion dereferences tx.RawData.Version with no nil check. Because the libp2p pubsub callback, the underlying go-libp2p-pubsub validation worker, and Klever's own network/p2p layer install no recover(), the panic propagates and crashes the entire node process. The attacker payload is a 3-byte protobuf message; no validator key, stake, funds, or on-chain account is required, and delivery aimed at enough of the BLS validator set can halt block production, resulting in a chain halt. This issue has been fixed in version 1.7.18.