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CVE-2026-21734

Publié : 26 juin 2026
Modifié : 26 juin 2026
Lien officiel NVD

Description détaillée

A web page that contains unusual GPU shader code is loaded into the GPU compiler process and can trigger a write out-of-bounds write crash in the GPU shader compiler library. On certain platforms, when the compiler process has system privileges this could enable further exploits on the device. An edge case using a very small value in GPU shader code can cause a segmentation fault in the GPU shader compiler due to am out-of-bounds write.

Références et Patchs

Dernières Vulnérabilités

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CVE-2026-55448

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CVE-2026-55441

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