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CVE-2026-18401

Publié : 4 août 2026
Modifié : 4 août 2026
Lien officiel NVD

Description détaillée

The non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser in jackson-core does not enforce the maxNumberLength constraint defined in StreamReadConstraints (default: 1000 characters). An attacker able to submit JSON to an application that uses the async parser API can supply a number token of arbitrary length, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a denial of service. The synchronous parser enforces this limit correctly, so the constraint is applied inconsistently depending on which parsing API the application uses. Root cause: the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase and related classes never invokes the number length validation methods. Number parsing methods such as _finishNumberIntegralPart() accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length check, then call _valueComplete() to finalize the token. _valueComplete() does not call resetInt() or resetFloat(), which are the methods in ParserBase where validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() are performed. Because that validation step is skipped, maxNumberLength is never enforced on the async code path. Impact: an attacker sending a JSON document containing an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (for example a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application) can cause unbounded allocation in the TextBuffer and an OutOfMemoryError. If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM may additionally be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing, causing CPU-based denial of service. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from version 2.15.0 through 2.18.5 and from 2.19.0 through 2.21.0, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0 through 3.0.x. Versions prior to 2.15.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints -- which defines the maxNumberLength setting -- was first introduced in jackson-core 2.15.0, so no such constraint exists to be bypassed in earlier releases. Note that GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq records the lower bound of the affected 2.x range as 2.0.0.

Références et Patchs

Dernières Vulnérabilités

CVE-2026-69263

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, the mitigation for CVE-2025-8943 blocked -y and --yes flags on npx, but packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts denied only PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH, and NODE_OPTIONS by exact environment-variable name. Because npm reads configuration from npm_config_* variables, setting npm_config_yes=true reproduced --yes behavior without using a blocked flag, causing npx to auto-install and execute the named package when a Custom MCP server launched. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3.

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CVE-2026-69262

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, `DELETE /api/v1/chatflows/:id` authorized requests with checkAnyPermission('chatflows:delete,agentflows:delete'), so possession of either permission was sufficient to reach the delete path. The delete logic then resolved the target record only by id and workspaceId and did not validate the target resource type, allowing a caller with only agentflows:delete to delete a CHATFLOW and a caller with only chatflows:delete to delete an AGENTFLOW in the same workspace. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3.

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CVE-2026-69259

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, the SQLite Record Manager node in packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/SQLiteRecordManager/SQLiteRecordManager.ts accepted user-controlled additionalConfig and spread it after the intended database setting, allowing additionalConfig.database to overwrite the SQLite database path. An authenticated attacker using the published Docker image, which ran as root, could write a SQLite database to paths such as /etc/chromium/exploit.conf; by controlling the table name and namespace value, the attacker could place shell syntax into the database file and trigger execution when Puppeteer launched Chromium and sourced /etc/chromium/*.conf. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3.

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