CVE-2026-116696
Description détaillée
russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. Prior to 0.65.0, russh::keys::agent::server::serve in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs accepts repeated SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM records while adding a key and appends every Constraint::Confirm record to the key's retained constraint vector without a count or memory limit. A process that can connect to the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent session, can repeatedly add constrained keys and cause renewable memory growth that persists for the process lifetime because keys without a lifetime constraint do not expire. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.
Vecteur d'attaque (CVSS)
Dernières Vulnérabilités
CVE-2026-118129
A vulnerability was found in jeremyckahn Chitchatter up to f82538633813c854a81a8b2112a2f6ba17b39cbc. The affected element is the function isConfigMessageEvent of the file src/Bootstrap.tsx of the component PostMessage Handler. Performing a manipulation of the argument parentDomain results in improper authentication. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been made public and could be used. This product follows a rolling release approach for continuous delivery, so version details for affected or updated releases are not provided. The patch is named e3babb5cd83bfe3b99f1d82358ac5c1ea8e8a688. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The vendor was contacted early, responded in a very professional manner and quickly released a fixed version of the affected product.
CVE-2026-104895
The asynchronous Smile parser (NonBlockingByteArrayParser) uses a raw-binary length prefix taken from untrusted input to allocate a byte[] before the body is read, with no upper bound and no overflow check. On the raw-binary marker 0xFD, _decodeVInt() computes (value << 6) + (i & 0x3F) without the (value >>> 25) != 0 overflow guard present in the blocking SmileParser._readUnsignedVInt, and _startRawBinary then allocates the declared length immediately. A Smile feed of roughly ten bytes can therefore force an eager allocation of approximately 2 GB, producing an OutOfMemoryError on reactive or asynchronous Smile endpoints. A VInt crafted to overflow int yields a negative length and a NegativeArraySizeException, a RuntimeException that is not a JacksonException and so escapes the parser contract. Either outcome crashes the request or processing thread. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2020-28491 in the CBOR parser of this library, which was fixed with a LONGEST_NON_CHUNKED_BINARY guard; the asynchronous Smile parser never received the equivalent guard. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required.
CVE-2026-104016
ProtobufParser parses length-prefixed protobuf string and bytes fields by checking (_inputPtr + len) <= _inputEnd and then, on the fast path, calling _finishShortText(len). Both use 32-bit signed integer arithmetic. When an attacker supplies a varint decoding to a length near Integer.MAX_VALUE, _inputPtr + len overflows to a negative value, the bounds check passes, and _finishShortText(len) reaches TextBuffer.expandCurrentSegment(len), which performs Arrays.copyOf with no cap and throws OutOfMemoryError: Requested array size exceeds VM limit. The JVM refuses arrays larger than Integer.MAX_VALUE - 8 before consulting available heap, so -Xmx tuning does not mitigate the issue. StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength and maxDocumentLength do not gate this path: a 33-byte payload is far below any document-length cap and the string-length check does not fire before the allocation. This was confirmed empirically against shipping artifacts with maxStringLength, maxDocumentLength and maxNestingDepth all configured. A February 2026 hardening commit added the equivalent overflow guard to the packed-array-length and message-length paths but left the string-length call sites unguarded. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required.