CVE-2026-112351
Description détaillée
Sunhillo SureLine before 9.1.5 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the networkDiag.cgi endpoint that allows an authenticated remote attacker with any web account to execute arbitrary commands as root by injecting shell metacharacters into the ipAddr or dnsAddr parameters. Attackers can bypass the incomplete character denylist from the prior CVE-2021-36380 fix using URL-encoded newline (%0a) or ampersand (%26) sequences that act as command separators after decoding in the ping, nslookup, or traceroute diagnostic modes, leading to full system compromise.
Vecteur d'attaque (CVSS)
Dernières Vulnérabilités
CVE-2026-118129
A vulnerability was found in jeremyckahn Chitchatter up to f82538633813c854a81a8b2112a2f6ba17b39cbc. The affected element is the function isConfigMessageEvent of the file src/Bootstrap.tsx of the component PostMessage Handler. Performing a manipulation of the argument parentDomain results in improper authentication. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been made public and could be used. This product follows a rolling release approach for continuous delivery, so version details for affected or updated releases are not provided. The patch is named e3babb5cd83bfe3b99f1d82358ac5c1ea8e8a688. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The vendor was contacted early, responded in a very professional manner and quickly released a fixed version of the affected product.
CVE-2026-104895
The asynchronous Smile parser (NonBlockingByteArrayParser) uses a raw-binary length prefix taken from untrusted input to allocate a byte[] before the body is read, with no upper bound and no overflow check. On the raw-binary marker 0xFD, _decodeVInt() computes (value << 6) + (i & 0x3F) without the (value >>> 25) != 0 overflow guard present in the blocking SmileParser._readUnsignedVInt, and _startRawBinary then allocates the declared length immediately. A Smile feed of roughly ten bytes can therefore force an eager allocation of approximately 2 GB, producing an OutOfMemoryError on reactive or asynchronous Smile endpoints. A VInt crafted to overflow int yields a negative length and a NegativeArraySizeException, a RuntimeException that is not a JacksonException and so escapes the parser contract. Either outcome crashes the request or processing thread. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2020-28491 in the CBOR parser of this library, which was fixed with a LONGEST_NON_CHUNKED_BINARY guard; the asynchronous Smile parser never received the equivalent guard. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required.
CVE-2026-104016
ProtobufParser parses length-prefixed protobuf string and bytes fields by checking (_inputPtr + len) <= _inputEnd and then, on the fast path, calling _finishShortText(len). Both use 32-bit signed integer arithmetic. When an attacker supplies a varint decoding to a length near Integer.MAX_VALUE, _inputPtr + len overflows to a negative value, the bounds check passes, and _finishShortText(len) reaches TextBuffer.expandCurrentSegment(len), which performs Arrays.copyOf with no cap and throws OutOfMemoryError: Requested array size exceeds VM limit. The JVM refuses arrays larger than Integer.MAX_VALUE - 8 before consulting available heap, so -Xmx tuning does not mitigate the issue. StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength and maxDocumentLength do not gate this path: a 33-byte payload is far below any document-length cap and the string-length check does not fire before the allocation. This was confirmed empirically against shipping artifacts with maxStringLength, maxDocumentLength and maxNestingDepth all configured. A February 2026 hardening commit added the equivalent overflow guard to the packed-array-length and message-length paths but left the string-length call sites unguarded. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required.