CVE-2026-105311
Description détaillée
The StreamsHub Console operator acts as a confused deputy: a Kubernetes tenant with permission to create a Console custom resource can set spec.kafkaClusters[].credentials.kafkaUser.namespace to any namespace. The operator, running with cluster-wide Secrets RBAC, reads the victim-namespace KafkaUser Secret (SASL credentials or TLS private keys) and writes the plaintext material into a Secret in the attacker's namespace. No same-namespace check or allowlist exists anywhere in the code path.
Vecteur d'attaque (CVSS)
Dernières Vulnérabilités
CVE-2026-95109
The Cortex-A7 MMU Modules port validates a caller-supplied buffer by translating **one address** — the first byte. The common Module Manager hands its range check the module instance, the start address and the complete byte size; the Cortex-A7 implementation discarded the instance and the size and asked the MMU a single question about the start. A memory-protected module therefore passed any range whose first byte was user-readable, however far the rest of it reached. Privileged dispatch code then read or wrote the whole range. Because every protected-module dispatcher that consumes a buffer or an extra-parameter array goes through this one macro, the defect is not in any individual service: it is in the primitive all of them rely on.
CVE-2026-95108
One logical thread of a user-mode ThreadX module costs the Module Manager's shared object pool two allocations, not one. The module asks for a `TX_THREAD` control block through `txm_module_object_allocate`; `_txm_module_manager_thread_create` then takes a second allocation of `TXM_MODULE_KERNEL_STACK_SIZE` bytes for the privileged kernel stack that thread's system calls run on, and records it in the control block. Both come from `_txm_module_manager_object_pool` and both are linked onto the module's allocation list. The Module Manager's thread-delete dispatcher released only the first. The kernel stack stayed allocated until the whole module was stopped, so a module that creates, terminates and deletes threads in a loop — every state transition valid, every service returning `TX_SUCCESS` — removed a fixed block from a finite pool shared by the manager and by every other loaded module, on every cycle, for as long as it stayed loaded. Once the pool is exhausted, no memory-protected module can create any kernel object and no user-mode module thread can be created anywhere in the system. Vulnerable function: `_txm_module_manager_tx_thread_delete_dispatch`, in `common_modules/module_manager/inc/txm_module_manager_dispatch.h`.
CVE-2026-95107
A ThreadX module chooses `object_size` when it calls `txm_module_object_allocate`. The Module Manager adds its own 16-byte private header to that size and asked the object pool for the result **without checking the addition**. A size near the top of a `ULONG` wrapped, the pool served a block far smaller than the header, and the manager then wrote the header past the end of it and into the neighbouring byte-pool block.