CVE-2025-66390
Description détaillée
In Microsoft Azure API Management through 2025-10-17, when self-service signup (username/password Basic Authentication) is enabled in Tenant A, an attacker can reuse the registration flow by changing the hostname or tenant identifier to Tenant B, even when Tenant B has signup disabled at the UI level. In other words, disabling signup in the UI does not disable the underlying API endpoint (which still accepts cross-tenant requests based on the Host header). NOTE: The supplier states that they evaluated the report and determined it did not cross a security boundary (i.e., the observed behavior was a configuration/state issue rather than an exploitable product vulnerability affecting tenant isolation). NOTE: The supplier evaluated this report and determined that it did not cross a security boundary (i.e., the observed behavior was a configuration/state issue rather than an exploitable product vulnerability affecting tenant isolation).
Dernières Vulnérabilités
CVE-2026-47410
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an insecure default cryptographic key. The JWT signing secret defaults to the hardcoded literal `"dev-secret-change-me"` when `PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET` is unset. A safety check exists but only fires when `PLATFORM_ENV != "dev"`; the default value of `PLATFORM_ENV` is `"dev"`, so the check is silently bypassed in any deployment that does not explicitly opt out. The attacker reads the literal from this public source file, mints a JWT with arbitrary `sub` and `email` claims, and authenticates as any existing user (including workspace owners and admins). PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
CVE-2026-47409
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no "cannot remove last owner" guard. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
CVE-2026-47408
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The `GET /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/activity` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` and dispatches to `ActivityService.list_for_issue(issue_id)`, which executes `SELECT * FROM activity WHERE issue_id = :issue_id` with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace can read the full activity log of any issue across the entire multi-tenant deployment. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.